In the absence of a successful international cooperative agreement over the control of emissions there is a growing interest in the role that clean technologies may play to alleviate the climate change problem. Within a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, we investigate, analytically and within a numerical example based on empirical evidence, the impact of the adoption of a cleaner technology (i.e., a decrease in the emission to output ratio). We show that countries may respond by increasing their emissions resulting in an increase in the stock of pollution that may be detrimental to welfare. This possibility is shown to arise for a signi…cant and empirically relevant range of parameters. It is when the damage and/or the initial stock of pollution are relatively large and when the natural rate of decay of pollution is relatively small that the perverse e¤ect of clean technologies is strongest. Cooperation over the control of emissions is necessary to ensure that the development of cleaner technologies does not exacerbate the free riding behavior that is at the origin of the climate change problem.
Introduction
We investigate whether the development and/or transfer of clean technologies can alleviate the consequences of failing to reach a global international agreement over greenhouse gas (GHG) There is also increasing support in the academic literature for the view that innovative technology will play a central role to resolve the climate change predicament. Barrett (2009) , argues that to stablize carbon concentration at levels that are compatible with a long-run goal of an increase of the earth's temperature by 2 C with respect to the pre-industrial era will require a 'technological revolution'. Galiana and Green (2009) similarly predict that reducing carbon emissions will require an energy-technology revolution and a global technology race 5 .
3 For example, a bill was introduced in the US to set up the International Clean Technology Deploy- Barrett (2006) argues that even treaties on the development of breakthrough technologies will typically share the same fate as treaties on emissions control since, unless technological breakthroughs exhibit increasing returns to scale, these treaties will fail because of the incentive of countries to free ride. However Hoel and Zeeuw (2009) show that this pessimistic outcome can be overturned if one takes into account that the adoption costs of a breakthough technology vary with the level of R&D. They show that a large coalition can be both stable and result in a signi…cant welfare improvement.
We investigate, analytically and through a numerical example using empirical evidence, the impact of adopting cleaner technologies within a framework that considers transboundary pollution emissions and where pollution emissions accumulate into a stock and therefore have lasting repercussions on the environment, two essential features of the GHG emissions'problem. Consider a world made of n countries or regions, we determine the non-cooperative emissions policies of each region and determine the impact of having all countries simultaneously adopt a cleaner technology (captured by a decrease in their emission to output ratio). Although we cover in detail the case of identical countries, our analysis allows the discussion of the case of asymmetric regions that di¤er with respect to their emissions per output ratio and where a 'clean'technology is being transferred to the regions that are using a 'dirty'technology. The case of asymmetric regions can be seen as a stylized model of the transfer of technology from developed countries to developing countries and where the technology transfer results in a decrease in the emissions to output ratio in the receiving country.
The adoption of a cleaner technology reduces the marginal cost of production (measured in terms of pollution damages) thereby giving an incentive to each country to increase its production. We show that the increase in emissions associated with the increase in production can outweigh the positive environmental impact of adopting a 'cleaner' technology. The bene…t of the extra consumption from the adoption of the 'clean'technology can be outweighed by the loss in welfare due to the increase in pollution. The positive shock of implementing a cleaner technology results in a more 'aggressive' and 'sel…sh' behavior of countries that exacerbates the e¢ ciency loss due to the presence of the pollution externality. The qualitative result and intuition extends to the case of the transfer of a 'clean'technology which can result in an increase in the pollution emissions of the receiver country and the level of the stock of pollution. Thus, a technology transfer can result in an increase of environmental damages and a decrease of the donor countries as well as the receivers'welfare.
Our …ndings can be related to those of Long and Sorger (2006) that builds on Tornell and Lane (1999) to consider the impact of the cost of appropriation on growth in an economy with weak or absent property rights. Rival groups can accumulate a private asset and a common property asset. Tornell and Lane (1999) show that an increase in the rate of return of the common asset can exacerbate the rent seeking behavior of the competing groups, and may end up reducing the rate of growth of the economy. They coined the term 'voracity e¤ect'to describe the increase in rent seeking behavior. Ploeg (2010) utility from wealth as well as from consumption 6 . They show that an increase in the appropriation cost reduces the growth rate of the public capital stock and thus obtain "the striking result that high costs of money laundering are detrimental to economic growth". In our model, it is the emissions per output ratio (which can be interpreted as the cost of production in terms of emissions) that can be negatively related to the stock of pollution and countries'welfare.
We use the seminal transboundary pollution game model in Dockner and Long (1993) and Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992) . In contrast with Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992) (2009) and Galiana and Green (2009) , but it is also necessary to prevent the implementation of the innovations from exacerbating the climate change problem.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 de…nes the Markov perfect equilibrium of the model that we use. We study analytically the impact of the adoption of a cleaner technology in section 4 and o¤er a numerical analysis based on empirical evidence of the model parameters in section 5. Section 6 contains a discussion of the impact of a transfer of clean technologies between asymmetric regions and section 7 o¤ers concluding remarks.
The Model
Consider n countries indexed by i = 1; ::; n: Each country produces a single consumption good, i . Production generates pollution emissions.
Let " i denote country i's emissions of pollution. We have:
where i is an exogenous parameter that represents country i's ratio of emissions to output 8 . The implementation of a cleaner technology in country i is represented by a fall in i :
8 For n = 2 and 1 = 2 = 1; our model is equivalent to Dockner and Long (1993) .
Emissions of pollution accumulate into a stock, P (t) ; according to the following transition equation:
with
where k > 0 represents the rate at which the stock of pollution decays naturally.
For notational convenience, the time argument, t; is generally omitted throughout the paper although it is understood that all variables may be time dependent.
The instantaneous net bene…ts of country i = 1; ::; n are given by
The objective of country i's government is to choose a production strategy, Q i (t) (or equivalently a pollution control strategy), that maximizes the discounted stream of net bene…ts from consumption:
subject to the accumulation equation (2) and the initial condition (3). The discount rate, r; is assumed to be constant and identical for all countries. We de…ne below a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this n-player di¤erential game.
The Markov perfect equilibrium
Countries use Markovian strategies: i (:) = Q i (P; :) with i = 1; ::; n. The n-tuple (Q 1 ; ::; Q n ) is a Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium, MPNE, if for each i 2 f1; ::; ng, f i (t)g = fQ i (P (t) ; t)g is an optimal control path of the problem (6) given that j (:) = Q j (P; :) for j 2 f1; ::; ng ; j 6 = i.
In the following section, we analyze the case where countries are identical, that is 1 = :: = n = : In this case, such a game admits a unique linear equilibrium and a continuum of equilibria with non-linear strategies (Dockner and Long (1993) ).
The linear equilibrium is globally de…ned and, therefore, quali…es as a Markov perfect equilibrium. The non-linear equilibria are typically locally de…ned, i.e. over a subset of the state space. We focus in this analysis on the linear strategies equilibrium. Since our contribution is to highlight an a priori unexpected outcome from the adoption of a "cleaner"technology, we wish to make sure that our result is not driven by the fact that countries are using highly "sophisticated"strategies.
Proposition 1: The vector (Q; ::; Q)
constitutes a Markov perfect linear equilibrium and discounted net welfare is given by
The steady state level of pollution
is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: We use the undetermined coe¢ cient technique (see Dockner et al (2000) Chapter 4) to derive the linear Markov perfect equilibrium. The details are omitted. (See Proposition 1 of Dockner and Long (1993) for the case where = 1).
We note that
It is straightforward to show that
4 Adoption of a cleaner technology
We consider the case where 1 = :: = n = : The implementation of a cleaner technology is captured by a decrease in the emissions to output ratio, ; and a¤ects all countries.
Throughout this section, without loss of generality, we normalize B to 1.
It will be useful to rewrite 9 the equilibrium production strategy as
where
The impact of a cleaner technology on equilibrium steady state pollution stock and equilibrium emissions turns out to be ambiguous. More precisely:
Proposition 2: For any > 0 there exists s > 0 such that for all s > s we have @P SS @ < 0 a decrease in the emissions to output ratio results in a larger stock of pollution at the steady state.
Proof: We now evaluate
. We show in the appendix that
and therefore
Let E (P ) Q (P ) , i.e. E (P ) denotes the emissions that are associated with the equilibrium production strategy Q (P ).
Proposition 3: There existsP such that
Proof: See appendix.
The adoption of a cleaner technology results in a decrease of emissions in the shortrun only when the stock of pollution is below a certain levelP . The results of Propositions 2 and 3 are illustrated in Figure 1 for a discrete change of from 0 to 00 < 0 :
there existsP 0 such that for P >P 0 ; the adoption of a clean technology results in a higher level of emissions in the short-run. When the damage caused by the stock of pollution is large enough, a cleaner technology results in an increase of emissions in the short-run as well as at the steady state (when P >P 0 ). 9 For details see the appendix. Emissions as a function of P as q changes from q'to q"< q'
Following the adoption of a cleaner technology each country increases its production.
The resulting increase in emissions outweighs the positive shock of a decrease in the emissions to output ratio and can ultimately increase the stock of pollution. Proposition 2 also establishes that the adoption of a cleaner technology results in an increase of the long-run (the steady state) level of emissions.
The welfare implications of adopting a cleaner technology is thus not straightforward since the increase of production is associated with an increase of pollution. We show that implementing a cleaner technology may end up reducing social welfare, (8) ; in each country: W i (P ) may be an increasing function of . From the optimality condition of a best response of a single player we have from the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation associated to a player's problem
The impact of a change in is thus
From the …rst order conditions of the single player's problem we have
and thus
We evaluate W at P = P SS ( ) For an analytical analysis of the sign of W j P =P SS ( ) rewrite
Recall that the equilibrium production strategy is given by
Taking the derivative of Q wrt gives
Evaluating Q Q at the steady state where Q =
which after using the facts that 
gives after substitution and simpli…cation
Main Proposition: For any n > 1, there exists s > 0 such that W j P =P SS ( ) > 0 for all s > s:
The positive shock of a cleaner technology results in a more "aggressive"or "voracious" behavior of countries that exacerbates the e¢ ciency loss due to the presence of the pollution externality. The intuition behind this result is similar to the one behind the 'voracity e¤ect' in Tornell and Lane (1999) and Long and Sorger (2006) path results in an overall more polluted world than would prevail if each country takes the rival's actions as given. The response of each country to a positive shock such as a reduction of the emissions to output ratio can be to expand its output. In this 'aggressive' setup, the extent of the increase in output is such that the increase in pollution that follows and the damage it creates outweigh the bene…ts from the additional consumption.
Remark: The Main Proposition's content mirrors the comparative static result in oligopoly theory that an increase in …rms' costs may end-up increasing …rms' pro…ts (see Seade (1983) and Dixit (1986) ). In our framework countries'instantaneous payo¤s do not depend on each other's ‡ows of emissions directly; they are interrelated through the damage from the stock of pollution, a stock to which they all contribute. A decrease of the emissions per output ratio is analogous to a decrease in the damage from the production of a unit of output. However in our context, the dynamic dimension, an essential feature of a climate change model, brings an additional level of interaction between players, compared to a static or repeated game, that contributes to our result.
Indeed, if one considers the simple case of two countries and where the damage arises from the ‡ow of the sum of pollution (i.e., if the cost of pollution were 1 2
sP 2 ), it can easily be shown that a decrease of the emissions to output ratio is always welfare improving, for any arbitrarily large value of the damage parameter s, in sharp contrast with the Main Proposition. One can possibly retrieve the 'voracity'e¤ect, present in the MPNE, in a static framework using a conjectural variations approach.
Dockner (1992) considered a dynamic oligopoly in the presence of adjustment costs and has shown that any steady state subgame-perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game can be viewed as a conjectural variations equilibrium of a corresponding static game 12 . However, the analysis of the full ‡edged di¤erential game allows to, …rst capture the intertemporal nature of the pollution game under consideration, and second take into account the transition dynamics when determining the impact of a decrease in the emissions per output ratio.
Numerical example
We investigate the sign of W numerically, using 'plausible' values of the parameters based on empirical evidence. We also present the e¤ect of non-marginal changes in the emissions per output parameter on equilibrium welfare.
We would like to emphasize the absence of consensus in the literature about precise values of the parameters of the model. This is partly due to the large uncertainty surrounding the economic repercussions of climate change. After a brief description of the ranges within which each parameter may fall, we start by presenting the impact of a change in the emissions per output ratio in a benchmark case and then conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to parameter values.
The value of the discount rate is the subject of important debates: The Stern Review uses 1.4%, Nordhaus uses 3 to 4%, others view discounting as unethical and that the rate of discount should be nil (Heal (2009) ). Most Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) (for example, the DICE model (Nordhaus (1994) ), the RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang (1996) ), the ENTICE model (Popp (2003) )) could have up to 20 regions but usually consider between 8 to 15 regions. Following Nordhaus (1994) , Hoel and Karp (2001) among others, we use the natural rate of decay k = 0:005.
The damage parameter is derived from estimates of the damage caused by a doubling of the stock of GHG. Let x denote the percentage of world GDP lost due to a change in temperature if the stock of pollution doubles. The value of x is undoubtedly the subject of heated debates on the political and academic arena and is crucial to de…ne the extent and the pace at which climate change related policies need to be implemented. In a recent study Tol (2009) conducts the di¢ cult task of aggregating the results of fourteen studies on climate change's economic repercussions and gives a relationship between the increase of temperature and the damage using di¤erent scenarios. The upper bound of the 95 percent con…dence interval of x is approximately 10% under the assumption that temperature would rise by 2.5 C and 12.5% if the temperature increases by 3 C.
13
Based on experts opinions reported in Nordhaus (1994) , Karp and Zhang (2010) estimate. We will use 2.5% in the benchmark case, and conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to x, using x = 5% and x = 10%.
We start by describing the benchmark case with n = 10, x = 0:025, k = 0:005 and r = 0:025. We de…ne the function
which represents the relative change in welfare as changes from 0 to and the stock of pollution is P . We plot in Figure 2 , G (P SS ( 0 ) ; ; 0 ) where 0 is set to 0.47 kg of CO2/$ of GDP (World GDP was estimated at $ 61.1 trillion and emissions of CO2 at 28.5 billions of metric tons) and set B = 2 0 so that when 0 = 1 we retrieve the same speci…cation of the linear quadratic models of transboundary pollution where instantaneous utility U is expressed in terms of emissions (e.g., Dockner and Long (1993) , Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992) , List and Mason (2001) , Hoel and Karp (2001) ). We can observe that a decrease of the emissions per output from 0 can result in a loss in welfare: the welfare loss from the increase in pollution emissions outweighs the welfare gains from an increase in consumption. Note that in Figure 2 , W (P )j = 0 < 0 and therefore when G (P; ; 0 ) > 0 The benchmark case represents a relatively optimistic scenario in terms of the damage of pollution. The sensitivity analysis that follows demonstrates that the consideration of less optimistic parameter values strengthens the 'voracity'e¤ect that follows a reduction in the emissions per output ratio.
The emissions per output ratio has to decrease below~ 0 = 0:11 (i.e., a decrease of 76:28%) for the decrease to be welfare enhancing. The threshold~ 0 falls to 0:0699 (i.e., a decrease of 85:1%) when we use x = 5% and to 0:0455 (i.e., a decrease of 90:3%) when x = 10%.
We plot W j P =P SS ( 0 =0:47) as a function of x. For the benchmark case, for all x > 0:42% we have W j P =P SS ( 0 =0:47) < 0. A marginal decrease in emissions per out ratio reduces welfare. The relationship of W j P =P SS ( 0 =0:47) with respect to x (which is a proxy for s) mirrors the result obtained analytically for the behavior of W j P =P SS ( ) in the limit case where s ! 1. The larger the damage parameter the more likely a decrease of the emissions per output ratio will be welfare reducing. Figure 4 gives that the graph of W j P =Z P SS ( 0 =0:47) is a strictly increasing function of Z, where Z is parameter that sets the initial level of the stock pollution relative to the steady state stock pollution. Figure 4 shows that W j P =Z P SS ( 0 =0:47) is positive for Z >Z = 0:49: The larger the stock of pollution at which we introduce a cleaner technology the more likely this will result in a welfare loss. The value ofZ decreases to 0:38 when x = 5% and to 0:29 when
Similarly, one can shown that W j P =P SS ( 0 =0:47) is a strictly decreasing function of k and is positive for k <k = 0:014: The smaller the rate of decay the more likely the implementation of a clean technology can reduce all players welfare. The thresholdk increases to 0:019 when x = 5% and to 0:027 when x = 10%.
These results represent rather pessimistic conclusions about the ability of technology to alleviate the tragedy of the commons, since it is when the damage is important and/or the stock of pollution is large enough, and nature is least able to absorb pollution, that a decrease of the emissions per output ratio is mitigated by the increase in pollution emissions of each player to the point where welfare diminishes.
Moreover, it can be shown that W j P =P SS ( 0 =0:47) is a strictly decreasing function of r and is positive for r < 0:252: It is when players are the most patient that a clean technology can reduce all players welfare. This is a rather surprising result which may appear to con ‡ict with the intuition gained from the folk theorem. From the folk the-orem, in a repeated game, the larger the discount rate the less possible it is to sustain cooperation. Here players are not using trigger strategies to sustain cooperation, only the non-cooperative scenario is analyzed. Moreover the impact of r is on the change on welfare due to a change in and not welfare itself.
This numerical example has demonstrated that the 'voracity' e¤ect is not a mere theoretical possibility. It is shown to be strong for a signi…cant and empirically relevant range of parameters. It is when the damage is relatively large and/or the initial stock of pollution are relatively large and when the natural rate of decay of pollution is relatively 'small', i.e. precisely the situations where the tragedy of the commons is at its worse, that the 'voracity'e¤ect prevails.
Transfer of clean technologies
Consider now the case of an asymmetric pollution game where countries di¤er with respect to their emissions per output ratios: we no longer assume that i = j for i; j = 1; ::; n. The analysis of the previous sections can be reproduced. However, since the intuition of these results obtained in the sections above carry over to this case, we refrain from doing so and just give the description of the results.
For simplicity consider the case of two groups of countries: i = l with i = 1; ::n C and i = h > l with i = n C + 1; ::; n. Countries are identical in all respects except for the emissions per output ratios. Clearly if n C n is small enough then, any transfer of clean technologies from the group of clean countries to the group of dirty countries, captured by a decrease in h can lead to an increase of the dirty countries'emissions and a smaller welfare worldwide. This possibility can also be shown to arise by considering the limit case where: l = 0. In that case the group of clean countries cannot condition their action on the stock of pollution even though they are impacted by it. Each clean country chooses to produce at a rate A: The objective of each of a 'dirty'country's government is to choose a production strategy, Q i (t) (or equivalently a pollution control strategy), that maximizes the discounted stream of net bene…ts from consumption subject to the accumulation
and the initial condition (3). 
Concluding Remarks
Given the unsuccessful attempts of multilateral e¤orts to control emissions and slow down the human contribution to climate change, the development and use of cleaner technologies is often invoked as the way out of the 'brink'. This paper shows that the failure of coordination over emissions may prevent the international community from ripping any bene…t from the creation and adoption of a cleaner technology and may even result in exacerbating the tragedy of the commons.
The decrease of the emissions per output ratio has two components, the direct effect which is a decrease of emissions if the quantity produced by each player remains unchanged and the indirect e¤ect since quantity produced changes and so do the emis- The results of this paper should not be interpreted as supporting the use of dirtier of technologies. The main policy recommendation is that the e¤orts of discovering and using clean technologies should not be viewed as a substitute for the need to succeed in a multilateral coordination of emissions. Similarly, the potential negative e¤ects on welfare of transfers of clean technologies should be interpreted as a recommendation to accompany technology transfers with agreements over limitations on emissions of the receiving country.
The e¤ort of creating and transferring clean technologies and the e¤ort of coordinating the control over emissions should be pursued jointly. Intuition would suggest that the potential negative impact of clean technologies would not take place if the adoption of a clean technology were accompanied with a well designed limit over emissions. Although this is intuitive, this idea deserves to be carefully studied as the impact of quotas in dynamic games are far from trivial (see, e.g., Dockner and Haug (1990 and 1991) ).
Barrett (2009) and Galiana and Green (2009) , among others, argue that a substantial and comprehensive change in technology is required to stabilize atmospheric concentrations and that market incentives are insu¢ cient to induce the necessary technological change. Barrett (2009) concludes that 'international cooperation is needed to set a carbon penalty, to increase R&D spending,...'. Our analysis shows that the international cooperation over a carbon penalty or emissions control is not only needed as an incentive to induce R&D and innovation, it is necessary to ensure that the development of cleaner technologies does not exacerbate the free riding behavior that is at the origin of the climate change problem. We have considered the impact of an exogenous change in the emissions per output ratio. The results of this paper suggest that the analysis of a model that embeds this framework and where investment in R&D to reduce emissions per output is taken into account, can be a promising line of future research.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3: There existsP such that E (P ) (>)0 for all P (<)P MoreoverP < P andP > 0.
Proof:
E (P ) = 1 2n 1 n 1 + 2n k + r + r 2n k + r ( + r) 
thus showing thatP > 0.
We now compareP to P : We have P = 2 n 1 + 2n 
which after simpli…cation gives (10).
Derivation of (11)
The steady state is determined as the solution to A n 1 2n 1 + 2A n (2n 1) k + r + r = k n + 1 2k r 2 (2n 1) P
which after simpli…cation yields A n 1 + 2n k + r + r = n nr k 2n P
Taking the derivative with respect to and multiplying each side by 
Derivation of (15)
The steady state is given by A n 1 + 2n k + r + r = n nr k 2n P
which can be rewritten as A n 1 + 2n k + r + r = 1 2 nr + k 2n P 
